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Abstract
Background: Performance-based financing (PBF) strategies are promoted as a supply-side, results-based financing
mechanism to improve primary health care. This study estimated the effects of Rwanda’s PBF program on less-
incentivized child health services and examined the differential program impact by household poverty.
Methods: Districts were allocated to intervention and comparison for PBF implementation in Rwanda. Using
Demographic Health Survey data from 2005 to 2007–08, a community-level panel dataset of 5781 children less than
5 years of age from intervention and comparison districts was created. The impacts of PBF on reported childhood
illness, facility care-seeking, and treatment received were estimated using a difference-in-differences model with
community fixed effects. An interaction term between poverty and the program was estimated to identify the
differential effect of PBF among children from poorer families.
Results: There was no measurable difference in estimated probability of reporting illness with diarrhea, fever or
acute respiratory infections between the intervention and comparison groups. Seeking care at a facility for these
illnesses increased over time, however no differential effect by PBF was seen. The estimated effect of PBF on receipt
of treatment for poor children is 45 percentage points higher (p = 0.047) compared to the non-poor children
seeking care for diarrhea or fever.
Conclusions: PBF, a supply-side incentive program, improved the quality of treatment received by poor
children conditional on patients seeking care, but it did not impact the propensity to seek care. These
findings provide additional evidence that PBF incentivizes the critical role staff play in assuring quality services,
but does little to influence consumer demand for these services. Efforts to improve child health need to
address both supply and demand, with additional attention to barriers due to poverty if equity in service use
is a concern.
Background
In sub-Saharan Africa, where pneumonia, diarrhea, and
malaria remain the leading killers for children under five,
the mortality rate remains twice that of the global average
[1]. Particularly vulnerable are children from the poorest
households, who are 80 % more likely to die in the first
five years of life compared to children from the wealthiest
households [1]. Children from poorer families often have
higher exposure to communicable and chronic diseases
due to inadequate sanitation, insufficient drinking water,
poor housing, and poor air quality, coupled with dimin-
ished resistance to disease due to malnutrition and micro-
nutrient deficiencies [2]. Exacerbating this problem, in
poorer communities health facilities are frequently under-
staffed, poorly equipped, and less well organized, resulting
in health services being less responsive to the needs of the
population [2].
Eight high impact preventive and curative child survival
interventions have been identified as those with “the high-
est potential impact on child mortality” if universal cover-
age is achieved [3]. These interventions include four
preventive efforts: measles and DTP immunizations; vita-
min A supplements; and distribution of treated bednets,
which all benefit from national campaigns that target all
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populations. The remaining four interventions, skilled at-
tendant at delivery, professional care-seeking for pneumo-
nia, use of oral rehydration for diarrhea, and treatment
with antimalarials, typically rely on formal health facility
services. The success of comprehensive facility-based
interventions requires a base level of service use to
have a measurable effect [4]. The question posed by
this study is whether a supply-side financing system
can increase the use of and improve the quality of
facility-based child health services, particularly for the
poor. Rwanda’s performance-based financing program
offers a good opportunity to examine this question.
Performance-based financing in Rwanda
In the late 1990s, the reintroduction of health service
user fees in Rwanda led to a rapid decline in service
utilization. The fixed salaries and standard bonus pay-
ment system for health providers, meanwhile, provided
no financial incentive to maximize productivity or ex-
tend the reach of services to the populations in need
[5, 6]. As a result, in 2005 the government adopted a
national performance-based financing (PBF) program
for health centers and hospitals. Performance-based
financing (PBF) is a supply-side health financing ini-
tiative that aims to improve the quantity and quality
of health service outputs through monetary incentives
to facilities and/or providers. Rwanda’s PBF was designed
to incentivize health facility personnel to increase access
to facility services, strengthen health worker productivity,
and improve service quality. PBF contracting with health
facilities allowed the local health authorities to distribute
these supplemental performance funds according to local
priorities; typically provider bonuses or facility supplies
and equipment.
Under these contracts, higher productivity was expli-
citly incentivized through a payment-per-service pro-
vided for 14 evidence-based primary maternal and child
health services (Table 1). These services, a mix of pre-
ventive and curative care, were incentivized at different
rates ranging from USD$4.59 per facility delivery and/or
emergency transfer for obstetric care to USD$0.09 for
the first prenatal care visit; curative care visits were one
of the least incentivized services at only 18 cents per
visit [7, 8]. Service quality was also rewarded based on a
quarterly quality score created from monthly monitoring
and assessment visits of select services. This quality
score was used to weight the overall PBF payment, such
that facilities received only a portion of the performance
payment if the quality score was not perfect. Quality of
growth monitoring visits was the most highly weighted
component (0.52), followed by curative care; management
of the facility was also included but with lower weights.
Evaluations of PBF in Rwanda and similar financing
strategies elsewhere have focused on assessing the pro-
gram’s impact on coverage of child preventive care ser-
vices and pregnancy-related maternal care, [8–10] yet
few rigorous studies have examined the effect of PBF on
usage of child curative care services in a multivariate
analysis with appropriate comparison groups, [7, 11] and
no studies were found to have examined the effect on
equity of child curative care use. Zeng and colleagues
evaluated the impact of PBF on incentivized and non-
incentivized primary care services in Haiti [12]. No effect
on the probability of preventive (vaccination, vitamin A
Table 1 Service outputs and quality weights used to determine performance-based financing payments
Service Outputs – payment per unit Payment Quality of services Weight
Visit and Outreach (USD) Curative care 0.170
Facility delivery 4.59 Delivery 0.130
1st time family planning visits (new users) 1.83 Prenatal care 0.126
Completed childhood vaccines on time 0.92 Family planning 0.114
four completed ANC visits 0.37 HIV services 0.090
One-month contraceptive resupply 0.18 Immunizations 0.070
Curative care visits 0.18 Pharmacy management 0.060
Child (0–59 months) growth monitoring visits 0.18 Growth monitoring 0.052
1st prenatal care visits 0.09 General administration 0.052
Content of Care Financial management 0.050
Emergency transfers to hospitals for obstetric care 4.59 Lab services 0.030
At-risk pregnancies referred to hospital for delivery 1.83 TB services 0.028
Malnourished children referred for treatment 1.83 Cleanliness 0.028
Other emergency referrals during curative treatment 1.83
Appropriate tetanus vaccine during ANC 0.46
2nd dose of malaria prophylaxis during ANC 0.46
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supplementation) or curative (treatment of pneumococcal
or diarrhea) visits among 1–4 year olds was found, while
the probability of infants receiving vaccination increased.
Facility selection in Haiti may have introduced endogene-
ity; however econometric techniques were employed to
control for potential selection bias. In the Philippines,
Peabody and colleagues evaluated the effect of PBF
on inpatient hospital care for sick children [9, 13]. They
found improved quality of physician care in intervention
hospitals yet no change in the rate of hospitalization be-
tween the intervention and comparison hospitals. Quality
of care was assessed quarterly using vignettes presented to
randomly selected physicians rather than direct observa-
tion or patient outcomes. In Rwanda, the phased imple-
mentation of the program enables identification of a
suitable comparison population and the assessment and
incentive strategy for quality of care provides a platform
from which to measure quality of care across a spectrum
of services, staff, and supplies.
The goal of this analysis was to estimate the effects of
Rwanda’s PBF program on the prevalence of childhood
illness, the care seeking behavior of households in re-
sponse to these illnesses, and treatment received at
health care facilities. More specifically, we explored the
effect of PBF by household poverty, testing whether
there was a narrowing of the equity gap in childhood
illness and services received between children from
the poorest and the least poor households.
Methods
Conceptual framework
Rwanda’s PBF incentives targeting prenatal care, facility
delivery, immunizations, and growth monitoring were
designed to provide the best start in life for infants and
ensure their healthy development. Using population-
based survey data, we first tested the hypothesis that
PBF reduced the prevalence of childhood illness and ex-
amined whether the effect of PBF on illness was uniform
across wealth status at a population level. Our second
analysis tested the hypothesis that the implementation of
PBF increased the probability of a caregiver seeking
facility-based curative care services for a sick child.
Lastly, among those who sought curative care, we tested
the hypothesis that the probability of receiving medica-
tions and/or rehydration therapy was positively influenced
by adoption of PBF.
Study design
In 2005, the Government of Rwanda adopted a national
PBF program with a phased implementation plan, facilitat-
ing an evaluation by the government in partnership with
the World Bank [8]. Under the direction of the original
program evaluators and concomitant with a Government
decentralization and redistricting process, geographic
areas nationwide were grouped on population density,
rainfall and livelihood. Eight groups were created with on
average 2–4 districts each; ten districts, among them the
three districts surrounding Kigali, were excluded from this
process due to previous PBF piloting. Districts within
these eight groups were randomly allocated to early imple-
mentation between January 2006 and November 2007
(intervention) and to delayed implementation (compari-
son) beginning in April 2008 [8]. However, following this
initial allocation, some facilities with prior PBF experience
were found in the comparison group. For programmatic
reasons the government requested uniform scale-up of
PBF across a district, such that if a facility within a com-
parison district was already implementing PBF then the
entire district should implement PBF. Thus the initial ran-
dom allocation to early and delayed implementation had
to be modified. Based on suspected early exposure to PBF,
five districts with minimal exposure were reassigned from
comparison to intervention group. One district was ex-
cluded from the evaluation due to extensive exposure. In
summary nationwide, PBF was scaled-up in 12 early im-
plementation districts, seven districts were allocated to
late implementation, and 11 were excluded due to previ-
ous pilot work.
Health facility catchment areas mapped closely to
the new administrative districts such that when an
intervention district adopted PBF, the district population
theoretically gained access to intervention sites. This design
allowed for comparisons over time between the early im-
plementers or intervention districts and delayed implemen-
ters or comparison districts. National household survey
data, collected independently from the PBF intervention,
provided pre- and post-implementation measures for se-
lected child health outcomes.
Data
Data from the 2005 Rwanda DHS (henceforth 2005) and
the 2007–08 Rwanda Interim DHS (henceforth 2008) pro-
vided individual and household socio-demographic charac-
teristics and health indicators for child health, including
reported illness followed by care-seeking and treatment re-
ceived for reported illness. The 2005 survey used a multi-
stage national sampling frame and selected 462 primary
sampling units (PSUs) [14] based on census enumeration
areas, with field work completed from February 2005
through July 2005. A subset of 250 of these DHS 2005
PSUs were resampled for the 2008 DHS from December
2007 through April 2008 [15]. Geographic coordinates
were available for 246 PSUs, facilitating the creation of a
panel dataset of matched PSUs from 2005 and 2008. The
11 PBF pilot districts were excluded from the analysis.
Longitudinal data from a total of 150 PSUs were thus used
in the analysis, with 86 PSUs from the 12 intervention dis-
tricts and 64 PSUs from the seven comparison districts.
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The panel dataset included 5781 children less than 5 years
of age at the time of each survey who lived in either an
intervention (3307) or comparison district (2474). Slightly
over half of the children were from the 2008 survey, 3157
(54.6 %).
Three primary outcomes were studied: prevalence of
childhood illness, care-seeking at a health facility for re-
ported illness, and treatment received among those who
sought care at a facility. In this analysis, care-seeking
was reported as success in actually being seen by a pro-
vider at a facility, therefore it does not include those who
may have tried to see a provider at a facility and failed. Re-
ceipt of treatment among those who sought care was de-
fined as receiving some medication for the condition. Data
for reported cases of diarrhea, fever, and symptoms of acute
respiratory infections (ARI), care sought for these episodes,
and treatment received were collected in 2008; treatment
information for ARI was not collected in 2005. Across both
survey years, illness with diarrhea, fever, or ARI in the pre-
ceding two weeks was reported for fewer than 30 % of
children; subsequent care-seeking was sought for
fewer than 40 % of the ill children, effectively redu-
cing the sample for the analysis of whether treatment
was obtained. To maximize the data available, re-
ported illnesses were combined as described below.
In the DHS, caregivers were asked if any child in the
home was ill with diarrhea, fever, and/or a cough with
short, rapid breathing (symptoms of ARI) in the previous
two weeks. Responses were combined into two dichot-
omous illness variables: illness with diarrhea, fever and/
or ARI; and illness with diarrhea and/or fever, excluding
ARI. This allowed the creation of data subsets for those
ill including ARI (n = 2073) and those ill excluding ARI
(n = 1742). Questions regarding treatment received were
asked only of the latter group in both survey years. Care-
givers who reported a sick child were subsequently asked
whether advice or treatment was sought from any
source. All those who reported seeking advice from a
public or private hospital, health center, clinic, or health
post were coded as having sought care at a health facil-
ity. Among those seeking care for diarrhea and/or fever,
a series of follow-up questions were also asked to iden-
tify any treatment or medications administered, either at
home or a facility. A dichotomous variable for treatment
received was constructed to indicate whether (a) a child
with diarrhea received oral rehydration salts, was recom-
mended home fluids, increased fluids, and/or antibiotics;
or (b) if a child sick with fever received a fever reducer
and/or an antimalarial. All other responses were coded a
not having received treatment.
The key independent variables were residence in a
PBF intervention district and household wealth quintile.
Assignment to the PBF intervention group was based on
the district in which the survey PSU was located; hence
all children from the same PSU were assigned identical
PBF status. Household wealth scores based on asset
ownership and housing characteristics were created sep-
arately for households in the 2005 and 2008 study sam-
ples. Polychoric principal component analysis (PCA) was
used to calculate a wealth score that maximized the con-
tribution of binary and categorical variables [16]. The
choice of assets for the wealth score was based on the
economic context in Rwanda and data availability. Assets
for 2005 included television, radio, telephone, bicycle,
and land ownership; housing characteristics included
electricity, drinking water, toilet facility, cooking fuel,
and flooring material. Three assets were excluded due to
perfect prediction with other assets: refrigerator, motor-
cycle, and car. For 2008, land ownership data was not
collected, car and motorcycle ownership were combined
as a single variable, and refrigerator was excluded, again
for reasons of perfect prediction. The first component of
the polychoric PCA was used to create the wealth index
score, explaining 59 % of the variance for 2005 and 57 %
for 2008. Households were divided into quintiles based
on their wealth index score; the wealth quintile was
assigned to each child living in the household.
Empirical model
A difference-in-differences (DID) estimation strategy
was used to evaluate the program effect of PBF on the
three primary outcomes: probability of childhood illness,
facility care-seeking and treatment received. The DID
strategy estimates the change in outcome for the inter-
vention and comparison groups over time and takes the
difference between the two trends to determine the aver-
age effect of PBF, written as:
DID ¼ YPBF08− YPBF05ð Þ− YNon−PBF08−YNon−PBF05ð Þ:
ð1Þ
A linear probability model with individual, maternal,
and household covariates included to reduce residual
variance and improve efficiency was used for estimation.
Community fixed effects were subsequently included to
control for time-invariant unobserved community differ-
ences. The DID with community fixed effects specifica-
tion is written as:
Y ijt ¼ β0 þ β1Xijt þ β2Y08t þ β3 Y08t  PBFj
 þ μj þ εijt;
ð2Þ
where subscripted indexes were defined as i = individual,
j = community or PSU, and t = time (2005 or 2008).
Terms in the model include the vector of covariates (X),
a dummy variable for time period 2007–08 (Y08 = post-
implementation), and a dummy program variable for
PSUs located in districts with performance based
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financing (PBF = 1 for intervention district, 0 for compari-
son). The primary coefficient of interest was β3, which
captured the effect of the PBF program on the outcome Y.
By subtracting the differences over time between program
and non-program areas, the unobserved time-invariant
community fixed effects (μj) were differenced out.
To identify heterogeneous effects by poverty, the
wealth quintiles were collapsed into a dichotomous
variable with the two poorest quintiles groups to-
gether as poor and the two upper quintiles grouped
as non-poor. Children from the middle wealth quintile
were dropped from the model. Adding an interaction term
between year, PBF, and poverty to the model allows one to
examine the change in probability of an outcome across
three dimensions: i) change in outcome over time, be-
tween 2005 and 2008; ii) change in outcome between the
intervention and comparison groups; and iii) change in
outcome between the poorest children and the least poor
children. The model specification is shown below.
Y ijt ¼ β0 þ β1Xijt þ β2Y08t þ β3 Y08t  PBFj
 
þ β4 POV ijt
 þ β5 PBFj  POV ijt
 
þ β6 Y08t  POV ijt
 
þ β7 Y08t  PBFj  POV ijt
 þ μj þ εijt;
ð3Þ
where subscripted indexes were defined as i = individual,
j = community, and t = time. A binary variable for poverty
was added (POV= 1 for the poor; =0 for the non-poor).
The primary coefficient of interest is the triple interaction
term (β7), which captures the difference in the impact of
the program between the poor and the non-poor. Due to
concurrent scale-up of a national community based insur-
ance program, interaction terms between insurance status
and PBF residence, and insurance with wealth quintiles
were also tested.
For each outcome a basic linear probability model
(LPM) and an LPM with community fixed effects were
estimated. Robust standard errors were clustered at the
district level where treatment was assigned. The LPMs
with fixed effects were used to calculate the DID and
DID with and without the poverty interaction. The full
basic and fixed effects models are presented in appendices
A and B [see Additional file 1]. Lastly, the fixed effects
models were run with and without “choice” variables
(insurance, prior facility delivery) to identify potential
bias in estimates due to inclusion of these variables
that may arguably introduce endogeneity to the model.
No significant or substantial differences in program effect
were found with or without these choice variables.
The study, based exclusively on secondary analyses of
publicly-available data, was reviewed and deemed exempt
by the University of North Carolina (UNC) Institutional
Review Board. All analyses were completed in Stata SE
11.2 (StataCorp, College Station, TX).
Results
There were no significant differences in the observed
characteristics of the intervention and comparison
groups at baseline (Table 2). In the 2005 survey, the re-
ported prevalence of diarrhea, fever and ARI was 15.6,
25.1, and 18.2 % respectively in the comparison group
(Table 3). Facility consultation among the comparison
group ranged from 12 to 17 % in 2005, and treatment
received ranged from 30 to 62 %. No statistically signifi-
cant differences between the intervention and compari-
son groups were found in the prevalence of these
illnesses, the care sought, or the treatment received.
Comparison of the absolute change in reported preva-
lence of diarrhea, fever, and ARI from 2005 to 2008 shows
a decline in prevalence in both the intervention and com-
parison groups, although the decline was significant only
for fever in the intervention group (−5.6 percentage points,
p = 0.018) (Table 3). Change in care-seeking behavior and
treatment received was heterogeneous across groups and
reported illness. Use of ORT increased from 2005 to 2008,
while use of antibiotics declined dramatically, though the
number of observations is limited. This decline may be at-
tributable to the seasonality of dysentery which is more
prevalent during the rainy season, when 2005 data was col-
lected, versus the dry season, when 2008 data was collected.
Among those with fever, fever reducers were more com-
monly taken compared to antimalarial medications. Use of
antimalarials in fact declined from 2005 to 2008 for both
the intervention and comparison groups, which may have
been due to a lower national prevalence of malaria [17].
There was no measurable difference between the inter-
vention and comparison groups in the estimated change
in probability of reporting illness with diarrhea, fever and/
or ARI (DID = −0.050), nor for reporting diarrhea and/or
fever only (DID = −0.028) (Table 4). Seeking care at a facil-
ity for these illnesses increased over time for both disease
groups by approximately 7 percentage points, however no
differential effect by PBF was seen (Additional file 1).
Data on medical treatments received were only avail-
able for those who reported an episode of diarrhea and/
or fever in the prior 2 weeks. The average estimated PBF
program effect on receipt of treatment, conditional on
seeking treatment at a facility, was 0.221 (p = 0.065), sug-
gesting a program effect on the quality of services pro-
vided in PBF districts. For this outcome, the basic LPM
without fixed effects produced smaller effects, smaller
standard errors, and a smaller overall DID estimate. This
is a departure from the pattern established for the illness
and care-seeking where the estimates were close in size
and typically slightly over-estimated in the basic LPM.
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One possible explanation is that the quality of services
may be more strongly influenced by the rural location,
which is differenced out of the fixed effects estimation.
When a rural dummy variable is included in the basic
LPM, rural residence is predictive of treatment (β = 0.163,
p = 0.003), conditional on seeking treatment.
Including a poverty interaction term allowed us to
examine the effect of PBF on equity of reported illness.
No differences in reported illness were found between
the poor and non-poor relative to PBF implementation
(Table 5). Estimates for care seeking relied on the sample
of reportedly ill children. The use of a Heckman selec-
tion model was considered but ruled out as no selection
bias for the subsample of ill children was found (i.e., the
probability of reported illness was not associated with
the PBF intervention). No significant difference in care-
seeking behavior by poverty and relative to PBF interven-
tion was estimated.
The impact on equity of child services is most appar-
ent when studying the effect on treatment received in
PBF districts. Children from the poor households in PBF
districts had a 44.6 percentage point higher estimated
probability of receiving medicine (p = 0.047) compared
to children from the non-poor households. This pro-
poor effect is even larger (β = 0.692, p = 0.002) when the
five minimally pre-study exposed districts are excluded
from the analysis (data not shown). This suggests that
the full-sample estimate produces a diluted program effect
due to some earlier exposure.
Discussion
The PBF program in Rwanda was designed to improve
facility-based primary maternal and child health services,
thereby reducing morbidity and mortality among vulner-
able populations. In our analysis, however, we found no
evidence to support the hypothesis that PBF districts
Table 2 Comparison of child, mother, and household characteristics between the intervention and comparison samples at baseline,
2005 DHS weighted data
Total Intervention Comparison Difference
(N = 2619) % (N = 1631) % (N = 988) % Perc.Pta p-valueb
Child
Age <12 months 590 22.5 376 23.0 214 21.6 1.40 0.406
Sex: Boy 1333 50.9 843 51.7 489 49.5 2.20 0.289
Birth order: 1st birth 439 16.7 275 16.9 164 16.5 0.40 0.846
Birth order: ≥ 5th 988 37.7 632 38.7 356 36.0 2.70 0.335
Slept under bednet 277 10.8 179 11.2 97 10.1 1.10 0.621
Health facility birth 586 22.4 348 21.4 238 24.1 −2.70 0.409
Mother
Age <20 years 497 19.0 336 20.6 161 16.3 4.30 0.064
Age ≥35 years 386 14.7 239 14.6 147 14.9 −0.30 0.886
Primary school grad. 445 17.0 275 16.8 170 17.2 −0.40 0.881
Married 1310 88.2 1429 87.6 881 89.1 −1.50 0.380
Previous child death 1126 43.0 714 43.8 412 41.7 2.10 0.495
Household
Wealth status
Poorest 498 19.0 318 19.5 180 18.2 1.30 0.619
Poorer 534 20.4 296 18.1 238 24.1 −6.00 0.050
Middle 548 20.9 367 22.5 181 18.3 4.20 0.109
Less poor 525 20.0 342 21.0 182 18.4 2.60 0.326
Least poor 515 19.6 308 18.9 206 20.9 −2.00 0.608
Health insurance 1283 49.0 771 47.3 512 51.8 −4.50 0.364
Rural residence 2399 91.6 1523 93.4 876 88.6 4.80 0.254
Improved toiletc 610 23.3 338 20.7 272 27.5 −6.80 0.077
Clean water sourced 871 33.2 601 36.9 269 27.3 13.50 0.066
aPercentage point difference between intervention and comparison groups
bT-tests comparing proportions between intervention and comparison groups
cIncludes flush toilets and improved latrines
dIncludes tap water and water from improved wells
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experienced decreased morbidity from diarrhea, fever, or
symptoms of ARI relative to the comparison districts.
Moreover there was no finding of a differential effect by
household poverty; that is PBF was neither a pro-poor
nor a pro-rich strategy for reducing childhood illness.
This is in line with findings from Schellenberg and col-
leagues, where no association between economic status
and childhood morbidity was found in a population-
based household survey in Tanzania [18].
There are several possible explanations for this finding.
First the window of time between initial program pay-
ments in June 2006 and the beginning of the follow-up
survey in December 2007 may arguably be too short to
observe an impact on childhood health from better
prenatal care, safer deliveries, and improved growth
monitoring. Second, disease prevalence declined nation-
ally likely due to multiple factors. For example, malaria
burden decreased dramatically following a national
insecticide-treated bednet campaign in September-
October 2006. The prevalence of malaria in Rwanda in
2007 was half of that reported in 2005 [17]. The season-
ality of data collection in 2005 compared to 2008 was
likely correlated with seasonality of disease, particularly
for severe diarrhea and malaria. Third, acute childhood
illnesses, particularly diarrhea and pneumonia, are the
result of environmental exposures to water and air quality
or crowding. PBF was not designed to change the home
environment or vectors for these diseases; rather the focus
Table 3 Number and percent of children reported ill, seeking care, and receiving treatment in past 2 weeks by study sample and year
Intervention group Comparison group
2005a 2008b Absolute changec 2005a 2008b Absolute changec
N % N % % N % N % %
Reported illness
Diarrhea 218 13.4 270 13.4 0.0 154 15.6 151 12.4 −3.2
Fever 437 26.8 426 21.2 −5.6* 247 25.1 276 22.7 −2.4
ARI 305 18.9 376 18.7 −0.2 177 18.2 212 17.5 −0.7
Facility consultation among those sick
Diarrhea 35 16.4 87 32.5 16.1** 18 12.0 36 23.7 11.7*
Fever 108 24.8 146 35.7 10.9* 66 27.0 96 35.7 8.7
ARI 90 29.4 98 27.1 −2.3 47 27.0 70 35.3 8.3
Treatment among those who received facility consultationd
For diarrhea:
ORT 22 61.9 56 64.4 2.5 11 61.8 26 73.0 11.2
Antibiotics 18 52.1 23 26.8 −25.3 9 49.9 11 29.9 −20.0
For fever:
Fever reducer 46 42.4 73 50.5 8.1 29 46.6 43 45.4 −1.2
Antimalarial 22 20.4 16 11.3 −9.1 19 29.6 14 14.7 −14.9
Denominators (not shown) change by study sample, year, and outcome
aT-tests found no statistical difference between the intervention and comparison groups at baseline
bT-tests found no statistical difference between the intervention and comparison groups post-intervention
cT-tests for differences between 2005 and 2008; *p < 0.05, **p < 0.01
dInsufficient numbers to calculate test statistic
Table 4 Estimated effects of PBF on reported illness, facility care-seeking, and treatment received among children under 5 years of age,
from 2005 to 2008: DID Estimates
Diarrhea, Fever and/or ARI Diarrhea and/or Fever
N DID coeffa (SE)b N DID coeffa (SE)b
Reported illnessc 4501 −0.050 (0.066) 4501 −0.028 (0.060)
Facility care-seekingd 1606 −0.081 (0.058) 1355 −0.072 (0.062)
Treatment receivedd – – – 399 0.221 (0.113)
aCoefficient for the DID term (β3 in Equation 2)
bRobust standard errors in parentheses
cLPM with fixed effects, covariates include: child’s age, birth order, gender, and facility birth; mother’s age, education, marital status; household wealth, toilet
facilities, drinking water source, and bednet use
dLPM with fixed effects, covariates include: child’s age, birth order, gender, and facility birth; mother’s age, education, marital status; household wealth, insurance
status, and previous child death
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of PBF was on increasing the use and quality of health fa-
cility services.
The theoretical argument for improved health service
outputs in PBF program areas is conceptually stronger.
Do provider incentives increase the proportion of sick
children seeking outpatient curative care visits? Or con-
versely, does a low incentive for curative services adversely
affect care seeking? No PBF program effect was found for
facility care-seeking among those with diarrhea, fever and/
or ARI, or just diarrhea and/or fever. Living in a house-
hold with someone who had health insurance and being
born in a health facility were associated with a higher
probability of seeking facility care, which may be indicative
of an underlying propensity to use the health system
(appendices). One could argue that these choice variables
are endogenous and may cause the results to be biased,
[19] however when the models were run without these
choice variables, no differences in outcomes were found.
An alternate interpretation of our results for care-
seeking behavior is that the dramatic increase in health in-
surance in Rwanda increased economic access to services
such as curative consultations for families in intervention
and comparison districts regardless of propensity to use
services. Community based health insurance or mutuelles
de santé (mutuelles) were developed in Rwanda in an ef-
fort to reduce the financial barriers and risks families faced
with unexpected medical costs and to mobilize resources
locally for health facilities. By 2007, an estimated 68 % of
households had at least one member covered by health in-
surance, 96 % of these participated in a mutuelle [15]. In a
2012 evaluation of Rwanda mutuelles by Lu and col-
leagues, the use of curative care consultations among ill
children with mutuelles insurance was double the rate
among those without insurance [20]. This reinforces simi-
lar findings of increased service use among the insured in
Rwanda [21–23]. Interactions between insurance and PBF
and insurance and wealth quintiles were tested but not in-
cluded due to insignificance. Disentangling the effects of
PBF from the rise of mutuelles is a difficult but promising
area for future study [23].
The quantity of curative care consultations was incen-
tivized through PBF at one of the lowest rates (USD$0.18
per visit), yet the quality of curative care was promoted
through the quality assessment. The quality assessment
covered multiple maternal and child health care services
and employed a series of observations, visual inspections,
review of records, and some provider and patient inter-
views. Of interest to this study, direct observation of pri-
mary care consultations for children less than 5 years of
age and an inventory of essential medicines and products
were included in the assessment protocol. Points were
awarded to facilities based on the adequacy of the different
services, supplies and facility environment observed. The
average quarterly assessment score served as the weight
for the final quarterly PBF incentive payment [24]. Quality
of curative care services was the most heavily weighted
item in the monthly quality assessment score and phar-
macy management contributed an additional mid-level
weight. So even though outpatient consultations were one
of the least incentivized services, the quality score was in-
fluenced by care provided and pharmacy supplies. This in-
centive design minimized the limited patient outreach role
played by providers but rewarded providers and facilities
for their critical role in assuring the quality of treatment
provided. The question is whether this quality assessment
embedded in the PBF incentive structure affected the
treatment received by sick children.
The data suggest that children living in PBF districts
were more likely to receive medications and/or ORT
when seeking facility care for illness in 2008 relative to
children living in comparison districts, although this
finding was not statistically significant. However this
finding masks the heterogeneous effects by poverty. The
poorest children in PBF districts benefitted more relative
to the non-poor in PBF districts and to those living in
comparison districts. In intervention districts, the quality
assessments included a review of pharmacy stock which
likely motivated facilities to maintain an adequate supply
of products. This finding provides further evidence to
support the notion put forward by Basinga and
Table 5 Estimated effects of PBF on reported illness, facility care-seeking, and treatment received among children under 5 years of
age by poverty, from 2005 to 2008: most poor compared to the least poor (referent group)
Diarrhea, Fever and/or ARI Diarrhea and/or Fever
N Interaction coeffa (SE)b N Interaction coeffa (SE)b
Reported illnessc 4501 0.056 (0.071) 4501 0.061 (0.070)
Facility care-seekingd 1606 0.109 (0.073) 1355 0.113 (0.094)
Treatment receivedd – – – 399 0.446* (0.210)
*p < 0.05
aCoefficient for the poverty interaction term (β7 in Equation 3)
bRobust standard errors in parentheses
cLPM with fixed effects, covariates include: child’s age, birth order, gender, and facility birth; mother’s age, education, marital status; household wealth, toilet
facilities, drinking water source, and bednet use
dLPM with fixed effects, covariates include: child’s age, birth order, gender, and facility birth; mother’s age, education, marital status; household wealth, insurance
status, and previous child death
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colleagues that those services within the control of the
provider and less reliant on repeated initiation by the con-
sumer, were more likely to improve under PBF [8]. Granted
not all cases of diarrhea or fever require a medical interven-
tion, however Boerma and colleagues found in a multi-
country study that the treatment of sick children was the
most underutilized service [25]. Huntington and colleagues
found a decrease in prescribed treatment for children seek-
ing curative care in pay-for-performance intervention sites
in Egypt; however, among those prescribed treatment the
probability of receiving medication during the visit was sig-
nificantly higher compared to those seen in comparison
sites [11]. Globally, universal coverage of oral rehydration
therapy could prevent an estimated 15 % of deaths under
age 5, while antimalarials and treatment of pneumonia
could prevent an additional 5 % each [26]. Given the excep-
tionally low usage for antimalarials in Rwanda, 5.6 %
among children under 5 years, and the low ORT use
(39 %), one can make the case for improving treatment
rates through the improved supply of medications [15].
Limitations
Despite efforts by the original PBF evaluators to ran-
domly allocate districts to intervention and comparison
groups, the reassignment of six districts was required
due to practical considerations of prior PBF implementa-
tion. However the DID estimation strategy used in this
study controlled for unobserved, time-invariant differ-
ences across the final intervention and comparison dis-
tricts that may have resulted from this reassignment.
Additionally, analyses run excluding these districts pro-
duced similar findings overall and stronger effects for
treatment among the poorest (data not shown).
The potential contamination of study findings by other
interventions or health system changes is a challenge for
impact evaluations and is one of the limitations of this
study. Econometric techniques were employed to control
for potential unobserved time-invariant confounders
such as community or facility infrastructure. Potential
bias remains, however, if unmeasured shocks to the
health system occurred for some and not all study dis-
tricts, particularly if an intervention was targeted to build
on the new PBF system. For example, if the President’s
Malaria Initiative substantially increased the availability of
artemisinin-based combination therapy for the treatment
of malaria only in intervention districts, perhaps due to a
perception by donors of better pharmaceutical supply
chains in these districts, then results may be biased. While
these scenarios may confound program effects, the alter-
native of withholding interventions for the duration of a
study is impractical given the multiple health challenges
faced in developing countries.
An additional limitation was the timing of data collec-
tion for the DHS in 2005 and 2008. Seasonality has
epidemiologic implications for the diseases studied,
hence the mismatch between seasonal data collection
in 2005 and 2008 likely contributed to the childhood
illness reported. However this should not bias any ob-
served intervention effects given that data were collected
during the same seasons in intervention and comparison
districts.
Conclusions
In the context of Rwanda, these evaluation findings sup-
port the hypothesis that incentivizing quality of care im-
proves quality among the poorest children. The incentive
structure rewards the critical role providers play in assur-
ing the quality of services provided. Yet an increase in care
seeking for routine childhood illness was not realized
under the supply-side incentive program. Looking beyond
the Rwanda experience, the findings from this study
should encourage the design of PBF programs with full
recognition of the relative strengths and weaknesses of the
system. First, health care providers will have the most in-
fluence on the quality of care and treatment provided
once someone seeks care at a facility. Hence, prescribing
the correct treatment or providing adequate nutrition
screening and immunizations to children is within the
purview of the facility and should be a part of any supply-
side PBF scheme.
Recruiting families into care is more difficult to do
without addressing demand-side constraints. Consumer
inputs designed to reduce financial barriers, such as in-
surance, or to increase demand through outreach and
education by community health worker (CHW) pro-
grams, are necessary companion strategies to supply-
side efforts. While evidence supports the use of CHWs
to reduce childhood morbidity and mortality from rou-
tine illness, [27] there are no rigorous evaluations of the
effect of incentivizing CHWs through PBF for child
health. In a PBF scheme, CHWs could be incentivized to
educate and refer the population to available child health
care services. Alternately, CHWs may be trained to pro-
vide some doorstep services for those families where
travel is a barrier to facility care. These services can
cover rapid testing and in-home treatment of childhood
illnesses such as diarrhea, fever or ARI. Implementing a
network of CHWs requires comprehensive training in
patient education, appropriate in-home services, and
recognizing signs and symptoms for referral care. More-
over, controls need to be put in place to monitor the qual-
ity of this off-site work as well as the validity of reporting.
An evaluation of Rwanda’s more recent experience with
expanding PBF to CHWs, will be a welcome addition to
the evidence base for PBF.
To address inequity in service use a targeted approach is
needed. Two targeting methods, geographic and needs-
based, deserve consideration. A geographic approach has
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been successful in countries where underserved popula-
tions are identifiable based on location, such as rural re-
mote communities or poor, urban slums [28, 29]. The PBF
incentive structure can be designed to favor service
provision in these communities through higher incentives
per service or combined with consumer vouchers to en-
courage use. A needs-based approach could either
incentivize services provided only to the eligible poorer
population, as seen in Bangladesh, [30] or could set differ-
ential performance targets that favor services provided to
the poor. Both methods oblige health facilities to identify
clients by wealth status, establish outreach efforts to re-
cruit clients from poorer households, and reduce con-
sumer barriers for these poorest families. In Rwanda PBF
targeting could build on existing government insurance
subsidy programs for the poorest 25 % of the population.
An equity performance target could incentivize services
provided to these beneficiaries of subsidized insurance.
Another program gaining traction in some countries is
the issuance of identification cards for poor households to
provide access to certain subsidized services. Access and
reimbursement for health services could become a more
prominent feature in these efforts.
As countries across sub-Saharan Africa strive to re-
duce childhood mortality, efforts to improve diagnosis
and treatment for the leading childhood killers are being
tested and evaluated. New PBF strategies are gaining
international attention as a potential financing mechan-
ism that will improve the scope and reach of services to
all families. Understanding the provider’s role and scope
of influence vis-à-vis access and quality will inform policy
makers who advocate for and implement change.
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